Whistleblower Blog

Part 6: States’ Experiences With Their Own False Claims Acts

This Part 6 is the final installment of an article explaining why the major qui tam whistleblower statute, the federal False Claims Act, has led to a wave of new state False Claims Acts. It is an updated version of part of a previously published article by whistleblower lawyer blog author Michael A. Sullivan.

V. States’ Experiences With Their Own False Claims Acts

As noted, at least twenty-eight states now have a False Claims statute, and many other states are considering similar laws. The financial incentives of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 have not only prompted states that lacked False Claims statutes to enact them, but also have caused many states wishing to qualify for the additional funds to amend their existing False Claims statutes.

In essence, while states may enact “tougher” or more comprehensive laws than the federal False Claims Act, states with “weaker” or less effective laws-as judged by the standards of the Deficit Reduction Act-will not qualify for the additional funds.

Seven of the first ten states whose statutes were scrutinized by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) quickly learned this lesson when OIG disapproved their state statutes. These included California (which lacked a minimum penalty), Florida (which omitted “fraudulent” from its definition of claims), Indiana (which did not make defendants liable for “deliberate ignorance” and “reckless disregard”), Louisiana (which did not permit the state to intervene in cases, set too low a percentage for whistleblowers to recover, and set no minimum penalty), Michigan (which omitted penalties and liability for decreasing or avoiding an obligation to pay the government, i.e., a “reverse false claim”), Nevada (which had a statute of limitations too short and a minimum penalty too low), and Texas (which did not permit the whistleblower to litigate the case if the state did not, and which provided for lower percentage shares to whistleblowers and lower penalties). Most of these states have gone back to the drawing board to correct these deficiencies.

In sum, the Deficit Reduction Act has set minimum standards for state False Claims Acts for states wishing to receive these additional funds. In plain English, the state laws must protect at least Medicaid funds, and they must be at least as effective as the federal False Claims Act, especially in rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for false or fraudulent claims, with damages and penalties no less than those under the federal Act.
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Insider Trading Probe Reinforces Immediate Need for Strongest SEC Whistleblower Program

Yesterday’s Wall Street Journal reports a “sweeping” insider trading investigation, with civil and criminal charges soon to follow, involving “consultants, investment bankers, hedge-fund and mutual-fund traders, and analysts across the nation.”

While the details remain to be seen, the unending series of fraud cases that continue–despite Sarbanes-Oxley–proves why Wall Street must not be allowed to neuter the first potentially meaningful SEC whistleblower program, mandated by the Dodd-Frank financial reform law.

How is it that the hallowed “compliance programs” born from Sarbanes-Oxley have utterly failed to stop the breathtaking frauds of Madoff, Stanford, and other recent post-SOX scandals?

As many honest employees encountering fraud discover, too often “compliance programs” mask efforts to identify employees who object to wrongdoing, so the wrongdoers can then gut their careers.

How well did compliance programs work at the many Madoff-abetting feeder funds that made scores of millions, as Madoff’s scheme spread to snare more victims? Read Harry Markopolis’ book to see how many of those firms’ “compliance” efforts worked, as Madoff’s enablers ignored glaring warning signs that multiplied over the life of the scheme.

SEC Chair Mary Schapiro and Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami seem dedicated to invigorating the SEC’s enforcement efforts. While the new proposed SEC whistleblower rules show considerable thought, they threaten the program’s effectiveness by bowing too far to industry concerns, and excluding many potential whistleblowers such as accountants, who may be the best position to stop the next Madoff.

Wall Street would have the SEC create a labyrinth of further exceptions to who can participate in the new SEC Whistleblower program. One lethal industry proposal is to require potential whistleblowers first to run the gauntlet of firms’ “compliance” programs–a concept wholly inconsistent with Congress’ intent that whistleblowers must be allowed to report violations anonymously.

The initial screening of SEC whistleblower claims should not be outsourced to the very firms alleged to have violated the law, which is what mandatory internal reporting effectively would do. The SEC–like the Department of Justice and IRS–should be the first to screen SEC whistleblower claims. With any SEC whistleblower claim large enough to pursue, by definition the culpable firm has typically approved the violation, or at least looked the other way.

Otherwise, who in a position to expose significant fraud would come forward, if required first to reveal their objections to the fraud to those who may have approved it? And if the fraud stays concealed–as it too often has despite “compliance” programs–the public loses.

Excerpts from the WSJ article by SUSAN PULLIAM, MICHAEL ROTHFELD,JENNY STRASBURG and GREGORY ZUCKERMAN are below:
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With New SEC Whistleblower Program Proposed Rules Announced, Will the SEC Allow Potential Defendants to Gut Them?

We have been awaiting the SEC’s proposed rules for its new SEC Whistleblower Program, released yesterday. Even before the announcement, however, those who oppose this first potentially meaningful SEC Whistleblower Program have begun efforts to undermine it.

The SEC’s website already includes some firms’ suggestions to impose extreme restrictions on SEC whistleblowers–contrary to how other successful whistleblower programs operate.

Designing any new whistleblower program should begin with studying more than two decades of successes of the nation’s major whistleblower law, the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act has been so effective in uncovering and penalizing fraud against the government since 1986 that it has inspired Congress and the states to enact a wave of new whistleblower statutes–including the Dodd-Frank whistleblower mandate in section 922.

Unless the SEC seeks to create an ineffective program, it makes no sense to impose restrictions on whistleblowers that do not exist in False Claims Act cases.

One such damaging restriction would be requiring whistleblowers first to report within the company violations of the law, before going to the SEC. Past experience with the False Claims Act shows that warning violators of the law (who know their own violations) invites destruction of evidence by those who engineered the lawbreaking, and destroys the whistleblower’s career.

Other deceptive suggestions are that the SEC follow the “approach” of the promising new IRS Whistleblower Program–but with far greater restrictions on whistleblowing.

For example, one representative of future defendants urges what are actually variations on the “one-bite” and “no-bite” rules of the IRS, which historically have restricted the IRS’s receipt of certain information, or information from certain whistleblowers.

In fact, the IRS trend appears to be the opposite. In a March 2010 IRS Notice and in June 2010 changes to the Internal Revenue Manual, the “one-bite” rule appears to be giving way to the more sensible approach of allowing whistleblowers more than “one bite” at submitting information that may be useful to the IRS.

Likewise, a suggestion that the SEC adopt a variation the “no-bite” rule would expand it far beyond the IRS concept of not accepting information from the “taxpayer’s representative” before the IRS. This suggestion would go much further and prohibit submissions to the SEC by anyone who has a “fiduciary” duty to a public company–which arguably could be most or all employees.

We will comment further on the specifics of yesterday’s proposed rules, but the basic principles above should guide the SEC in what it finally decides.

The SEC’s announcement yesterday is reprinted below:
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Links to SEC Whistleblower and CFTC Whistleblower Lawyer Information

Our whistleblower lawyer blog has followed closely the development of the first potentially meaningful SEC Whistleblower and Commodities Whistleblower Programs. That link provides regular updates.

Based on our firm’s long experience in representing whistleblowers, we were asked by the Senate Banking Committee staff for input in how the new SEC and CFTC whistleblower provisions of the July 2010 Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act should work. We urged that the Senate change the tepid House version, which provided no meaningful rewards to whistleblowers,
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SEC Recovers $39 Million under Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for Bribery and Kickbacks in Mexico and Iraq

One of the most interesting twists to the new SEC Whistleblower Program will be how many commercial bribes and kickbacks paid to foreign government officials will now come to light. As we have written about previously, the SEC shares jurisdiction with the Justice Department over such cases that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

An example of why whistleblowers will come forward is this afternoon’s announcement of the SEC’s $39 million settlement with ABB Ltd (“ABB”), a Swiss company that provides power and automation products and services.

The SEC alleged that ABB made more than $2.7 million in bribes and kickbacks to obtain more than $100 million in contracts. The payments allegedly were made to “government officials in Mexico to obtain business with government owned power companies,” and to the “former regime in Iraq to obtain contracts under the United Nations Oil for Food Program.”

According to the SEC, some of the kickbacks were made through bank guarantees and cash payments. As is common in disguising unlawful payments, the kickbacks were recorded on the company’s books as legitimate payments–here, for “after sales services,” “consultation costs,” and “commissions.”

ABB, without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, agreed not only to pay disgorgement and penalties totalling more than $39 million, but also agreed to pay a criminal fine of $30,420,000, according to the SEC. The company also agreed to be bound by certain “undertakings” concerning its FCPA compliance program.

As to how an FCPA whistleblower might fare who reports similar FCPA violations of bribery of foreign government officials, the new SEC Whistleblower Program pays 10% to 30% of monetary sanctions collected–approximately $4 million to $12 million under similar facts.

The SEC’s announcement is reprinted in full below, and the SEC’s Complaint is linked here:
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Health Care Fraud Cases and 2009-2010 Amendments to False Claims Act Discussed at National Fraud and Compliance Forum

At the annual Fraud and Compliance Forum in Baltimore that runs through Tuesday, the nation’s top health care lawyers will be paying close attention to recent changes to the nation’s primary whistleblower law, the False Claims Act. The “qui tam” provisions of the False Claims Act allow private citizen whistleblowers (“relators”) to share in the government’s recovery of damages.

As a former defense attorney who now represents whistleblowers, I have been asked to present a program at this conference with Rick Shackelford of King & Spalding, to discuss these major amendments to the False Claims Act–the first since 1986. Congress acted decisively in three recent major bills to restore the False Claims Act to its intended strength, in the face of court decisions that created obstacles to its use.

The recent amendments were part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (“FERA”); the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (“PPACA”); and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (the “Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act”).

This week’s forum is sponsored by the American Health Lawyers Association and Health Care Compliance Association.

An updated discussion of the False Claims Act after these 2009 and 2010 changes will appear soon on this Whistleblower Lawyer Blog. A brief summary of those important changes to the Act is below:
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Indiana Attorney General Invites Qui Tam Whistleblower Cases by Health Care & Pharmaceutical Employees To Stop Health Care Fraud

Smart and effective state Attorneys General have fought fraud against their citizens through encouraging greater use of the country’s major whistleblower law, the False Claims Act, and state versions of that law.

Texas AG Greg Abbott, for example, has a staff that has long distinguished itself for recovering millions of stolen taxpayer funds in health care fraud cases, under the leadership of Pat O’Connell and, more recently, Ray Winter.

Following this tradition, Indiana AG Greg Zoeller is urging employees of pharmaceutical companies and heath care entities to help stop health care fraud, and possibly share in the recovery as qui tam whistleblowers under the state and federal False Claims Acts.

While we have discussed in detail how the False Claims Act operates, AG Zoeller’s announcement gives a succinct summary. We have reprinted it below, and applaud his efforts.
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Shouldn’t the IRS Pay Tax Whistleblowers Who Help Prevent Fraudulent Refunds?

When IRS whistleblowers save U.S taxpayers money, they deserve the rewards that lawmakers such as Sen. Chuck Grassley fought to establish. In 2006 his efforts resulted in the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower program ever, which is attracting many tax whistleblowers with significant evidence.

We have discussed previously the many positive aspects of the long-awaited IRS Whistleblower procedures published in June–and one illogical, self-defeating feature. Some in the IRS–and apparently not the IRS Whistleblower Office–thought whistleblowers should not be rewarded when they report tax
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Merck and Other Pharma Companies Probed by DOJ and SEC in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Investigation

When Pharma manufacturers are targeted by the Department of Justice, qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act are often the reason.

Now, whistleblowers may also receive rewards for reporting violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), thanks to the new whistleblower provisions of the Wall Street financial reform law. Announcements like Merck’s recent SEC filing that it is now the subject an FCPA investigation involving other Pharma companies should become common, as corruption will now be increasingly exposed in a new wave of SEC Whistleblower cases.

The recent 10-Q filing of Merck & Co., Inc. stated in part:

The Company has received letters from the DOJ and the SEC that seek information about activities in a number of countries and reference the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Company is cooperating with the agencies in their requests and believes that this inquiry is part of a broader review of pharmaceutical industry practices in foreign countries.

As we have followed through its development, the Dodd-Frank financial reform law created the new SEC Whistleblower and CFTC Whistleblower programs, which will include FCPA cases.

The FCPA, as we have discussed previously, prohibits bribery of foreign government officials in international business transactions, and false entries in books and records of those companies within the statute. Whistleblowers who assist the SEC recover monetary sanctions in FCPA cases now have an enforceable right to a monetary award of 10-30%.

Pharma’s exposure for any bribes and kickbacks abroad are a ripe subject for FCPA enforcement.
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Does SEC Whistleblower Reward of $1 Million Signal A New Attitude Toward Wall Street Whistleblowing?

Only days after the new financial reform law created the first potentially meaningful awards for whistleblowers reporting securities and commodities violations and abuses, the SEC may have signaled a new attitude toward encouraging whistleblowers.

The SEC recently announced its first million dollar award for a whistleblower’s report of information about insider trading involving hedge fund adviser Pequot Capital Management, Inc., its chief executive, Arthur J. Samberg, and David E. Zilkha, a Microsoft employee.

Although $1 million may not sound like much when compared to the losses caused by the Madoffs of the world, it is a dramatic improvement over what the SEC had done before.

In following the development of the new SEC Whistleblower Program, we previously discussed the Inspector General’s summary of how, over the past eleven years, the SEC had paid a total of less than $160,000 to reward whistleblowers under the “old” SEC bounty program for whistleblowers. The IG reported:

The SEC bounty program has made very few payments to whistleblowers since its inception and received a relatively small number of bounty applications. As a result, the program’s success has been minimal and its existence is practically unknown.
Since the inception of the SEC bounty program in 1989, the SEC has paid a total of $159,537 to five claimants as detailed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Bounty Payments to Whistleblowers Bounty Claimant Year Bounty Amount 1) Claimant 1 1989 $3,500 2) Claimant 2 2001 $18,152 3) Claimant 3 2002 $29,079 4) Claimant 4 2005 $17,500 4) Claimant 4 2006 $29,920 4) Claimant 4 2009 $55,220 5) Claimant 5 2007 $6,166
Total $159,537
Source: OIG Generated

Just as another Inspector General’s report in 2006 set the stage for the successful new IRS Whistleblower Program that is attracting many reports of even billions in tax liability, let’s hope this Inspector General’s report has motivated the SEC to make full use of the opportunity to build a meaningful whistleblower program. We are already getting calls from potential Wall Street whistleblowers wishing to take advantage of it, and it could be a rewarding process–depending on how well the SEC seizes the opportunity.

The SEC’s recent announcement of the $1 million reward is reprinted below:
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Long-Awaited IRS Whistleblower Rule “Fix” Is Released for Comment

We have written previously about Senator Grassley’s pointed criticisms of aspects of the IRS whistleblower rules proposed in June 2010. The IRS’s delay in finalizing those rules is a principal reason why the IRS has not yet paid whistleblowers who have come forward since the December 2006 creation of the new IRS Whistleblower Program.

Today, the IRS took a large step to correct one major flaw that Grassley urged be corrected: re-writing a bizarre rule that would deny rewards to valuable whistleblowers who prevent improper refunds, or reduce a credit balance by a taxpayer. From what we can tell, that nonsensical rule was not the creation of the IRS Whistleblower Office, but of others within the IRS.

The IRS today announced a new IRS whistleblower rule to correct that anomaly, to be published for comment in the Federal Register.

Specifically, in a June 21, 2010 letter to Treasury Secretary Tim Geitner, Grassley challenged the IRS to write a sensible rule to correct this result:


In addition to the IRS posting the new [Internal Revenue Manual] provisions without public comment, there are many substantive concerns within the IRM. For example, the new definition of “collected proceeds” is particularly troubling because it seems to limit the payment of awards to whistleblowers only in those instances where the IRS receives cash payment from a taxpayer. . . . The denial of a whistleblower award where the whistleblower’s information leads to the denial of a claim for refund seems to create a perverse incentive for the whistleblower to wait until the IRS has paid an improper refund. In addition, the IRM says that satisfaction of a taxpayer’s liabilities by reducing a credit balance is not within the scope of collected proceeds so the whistleblower would receive no award.

The new proposed rule attempts at least a partial fix. It provides that rewards may now be paid on “amounts collected prior to receipt of the information if the information provided results in the denial of a claim for refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax liability incurred because of the information provided.”

Today’s proposed rule does nothing to address Grassley’s other criticisms of the June 2010 proposed rules.
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Activities of IRS Large Business and International Division Earn Its Commissioner Recognition As “Tax Person of the Year”

Citing many developments in the IRS Large Business and International Division in 2010, Tax Analysts this week named IRS LB&I Commissioner Heather Maloy as its “Tax Person of the Year.”

Among those developments that we have followed previously are the international focus of the restructured LB&I division (formerly known as the Large and Mid-Size Business Division (LMSB)), and the creation of the new Global High Wealth Industry Group within LB&I. That group within LB&I is already is working some very significant IRS Whistleblower cases.

Also mentioned by Tax Notes was one of my favorite IRS professionals who assisted the new IRS Whistleblower Program in its infancy, Stuart Mann:
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New SEC Whistleblower Program to Benefit from SEC’s Appointment of New Enforcement Official?

The SEC has just announced that current senior advisor to SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro, Stephen L. Cohen, has been named an Associate Director of the Division of Enforcement.

We hope this is good news for the nascent SEC Whistleblower Program. The SEC recently announced that its delaying creation of an SEC Whistleblower Office for budget reasons.

Steve Cohen has advised Chairman Schapiro on a number of issues including the SEC Whistleblower program, which I have discussed with him briefly earlier this year.

Coincidentally, the announcement came on yesterday’s deadline for comments on the SEC’s proposed rules for SEC whistleblowers, which must be substantially revamped so as not to defeat Congress’ purpose by discouraging meaningful whistleblowers from coming forward. We have submitted our own comments to the SEC on its proposed whistleblower rules, and will discuss later others’ comments here. See our comments

The SEC’s press release is reprinted below:
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IRS Whistleblower Claims Reporting Tax Evasion and “Overlooked” Returns

Tax whistleblowers using the new IRS Whistleblower Program have reported many instances of tax evasion involving domestic and foreign corporations, partnerships, and trusts, in addition to abusive offshore transactions about which we have written previously. These tax whistleblowers will allow the IRS to reduce the more than $300 billion “tax gap”–the difference between what tax cheats owe, but refuse to pay.

Tax evasion generally entails taxpayers understating taxes in the returns they file. In many cases evasion also entails taxpayers failing to file returns, especially information returns (as opposed to tax returns).

For example, partnership returns (Form 1065) are information returns and as such do not report tax payable. Cases of partnership tax evasion sometimes arise where filing Form 1065 is “overlooked.” In many of these cases, the partners continue to file their own income tax returns, which typically understate taxable income and tax payable, as there are no K-1’s to report.

Another partnership information return frequently overlooked is Form 8275. This form should generally be filed where partners have made partnership contributions, and received partnership distributions, within a two year period. Failing to file 8275’s typically results in an underpayment of tax where the disguised sale rules operate to treat the contribution and distribution as a sale.

Cancellation Of Debt (“COD”) is another area where non-filing of information returns (generally Form 1099-C) often results in an underpayment of tax, particularly in relation to non-institutional debt.

The problem of overlooked returns is not limited to income tax. Another return that is frequently overlooked is Form 709. This form should be filed by individuals who gift property that does not qualify for exclusion from gift tax.

On the international side, taxpayer interests in foreign companies should often be information reported on Form 5471. Where taxpayers have interests in foreign companies that hold interests in other foreign companies, multiple 5471’s may need to be filed to reflect second tier or higher tier interests. Failing to file 5471’s typically results in an underpayment of tax where foreign company income is required to be included in US income, for example under the Subpart F rules.
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Special: Article Explaining the 2010 False Claims Act and State False Claims Acts

Three years ago, our whistleblower lawyer blog presented an in-depth article discussing the nation’s major whistleblower law, the False Claims Act, and the wave of new state False Claims Acts.

Since then in 2009-2010, Congress has amended the False Claims Act three times to remove obstacles created by courts, which had limited the law’s effectiveness. To reflect those important and needed changes in the law, I have updated this article to present at the 2010 Fraud and Compliance Forum sponsored by the American Health Lawyers Association and Health Care Compliance Association.

That detailed article is excerpted here to explain the False Claims Act, with its 2009-2010 amendments. For ease of reading, it is divided into six parts:

Part 1: Introduction: What You Should Know About the False Claims Act And New State False Claims Acts After the 2009-2010 Amendments

Part 2: The False Claims Act and the Increasing Number of State False Claims Acts

Part 3: The False Claims Act: Background & History

Part 4: How the False Claims Act Works After the 2009-2010 Amendments (with Comparisons to Some State False Claims Acts)

Part 5: The Trend of Recoveries Under the False Claims Act

Part 6: States’ Experiences With Their Own False Claims Acts

If you have any questions about a potential False Claims Act case, please feel free to contact us at 800-228-9159, or send an email through the link here.
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Part 1: Introduction: What You Should Know About the False Claims Act And New State False Claims Acts After the 2009-2010 Amendments

This is Part 1 of an updated explanation of the major qui tam whistleblower statutes, the federal False Claims Act and the new state False Claims Acts. This Part 1 provides an introduction to the False Claims Act.

In 2010, more than ever, it is essential for lawyers to understand their clients’ potential liabilities under the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”). The health care industry increasingly has become the major focus of the federal government’s enforcement efforts, and usually pays at least two-thirds of the money recovered each year under this anti-fraud statute.

Adding to the health care lawyer’s challenges, since 2009 Congress has amended the False Claims Act three times, primarily to overturn judicial decisions that once created obstacles to FCA actions. Those amendments also have created an important new basis of FCA liability – retention of overpayments – which has great significance to health care providers. These 2009-2010 amendments make the FCA a far more effective enforcement tool for the government, and thus a much greater problem for defendants accused of health care fraud.

Further, a wave of new “whistleblower” statutes continues, inspired by the successes of the False Claims Act. These new laws include (1) an increasing number of state versions of the federal False Claims Act; (2) the new IRS Whistleblower Rewards Program; and (3) new “SEC Whistleblower” and “CFTC Whistleblower” programs, authorized in July 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act. By encouraging employees, contractors, and others to report allegations of fraud, these new whistleblower provisions create substantial concerns for health care organizations and other defendants alleged to be liable.

This article provides an overview of what health care lawyers should know about the federal False Claims Act and the new state False Claims Acts. As discussed below, the state Acts mirror the federal False Claims Act in important respects, but can differ in some significant ways.
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Part 2: The False Claims Act and the Increasing Number of State False Claims Acts

This is Part 2 of an explanation the federal False Claims Act and the new state False Claims Acts with qui tam whistleblower provisions. This Part 2 discusses the sound policy reasons underlying the False Claims Act.

I. Why Have A “False Claims Act”?

Fraud is perhaps so pervasive and, therefore, costly to the Government due to a lack of deterrence. GAO concluded in its 1981 study that most fraud goes undetected due to the failure of Governmental agencies to effectively ensure accountability on the part of program recipients and Government contractors. The study states:

For those who are caught committing fraud, the chances of being prosecuted and eventually going to jail are slim. . . . The sad truth is that crime against the Government often does pay.(Quoted from legislative history of 1986 amendments to False Claims Act).

Fraud – and allegations of fraud – plagues government spending at every level. Today, as the federal government struggles to fund the hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on health care through Medicare, Medicaid, and other programs; the Iraq and Afghanistan wars; the financial “bailout” measures enacted after the 2008 financial collapse; disaster relief efforts; and government grants and programs of every description, there is no shortage of opportunities for fraud against the public fisc.

The federal False Claims Act has been the federal government’s “primary” weapon to recover losses from those who defraud it. The Act not only authorizes the government to pursue actions for treble damages and penalties, but also empowers and provides incentives to private citizens to file suit on the government’s behalf as “qui tam relators.” Over the past two decades, recoveries for the federal government have grown dramatically since Congress amended the Act in 1986 to encourage greater use of the qui tam provisions, as part of a “coordinated effort of both the [g]overnment and the citizenry [to] decrease this wave of defrauding public funds.”

The federal False Claims Act since 1986 has been successful in recovering more than $27 billion, increasingly through qui tam lawsuits brought by private citizens. In light of the federal Act’s successes, Congress in the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 created a large financial “carrot” for states that adopt state versions of the False Claims Act. Any state that passes its own “False Claims” statute with qui tam or whistleblower provisions that are at least as effective as those of the federal Act becomes eligible for a 10% increase in its share of Medicaid fraud recoveries.
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Part 3: The False Claims Act: Background & History

This is Part 3 of an updated explanation of the major qui tam whistleblower statutes, the federal False Claims Act and the new state False Claims Acts. This Part 3 explains the history of the False Claims Act and why effective whistleblower laws are important.

II. Background of the Federal False Claims Act

Although the False Claims Act may be the best known qui tam statute, it is far from being the first. Qui tam actions date back to English law in the 13th and 14th Centuries. This tradition took root in the American colonies and, by 1789, states and the new federal government had authorized qui tam actions in various contexts.

According to one writer:

In the early years of the Nation, the qui tam mechanism served a need at a time when federal and state governments were fairly small and unable to devote significant resources to law enforcement. As the role of the Government expanded, the utility of private assistance in law enforcement did not diminish. If anything, changes in the role and size of Government created a greater role for this method of law enforcement.

A. Birth of the False Claims Act:

The Civil War prompted Congress to enact the original False Claims Act in 1863. As government spending on war materials increased, dishonest government contractors took advantage of opportunities to defraud the United States government. “Through haste, carelessness, or criminal collusion, the state and federal officers accepted almost every offer and paid almost any price for the commodities, regardless of character, quality, or quantity.”

One senator explained how the qui tam provisions of the Act were intended to work:
The effect of the [qui tam provisions] is simply to hold out to a confederate a strong temptation to betray his co-conspirator, and bring him to justice. The bill offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court and betrays his co-conspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to that class. . . . In short, sir, I have based the [qui tam provision] upon the old fashioned idea of holding out a temptation and setting a rogue to catch a rogue, which is the safest and most expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.

The original Act provided for double damages, plus a $2,000 forfeiture for each claim submitted. If a private citizen or “relator” used the qui tam provision to file suit, the government had no right to intervene or control the litigation. A successful “relator” was entitled to one-half of the government’s recovery.

The Act survived in substantially its original form until World War II. In a classic and oft-quoted 1885 passage, one court rejected the argument that courts should limit the statute’s reach on the grounds that qui tam actions were poor public policy:

The statute is a remedial one. It is intended to protect the treasury against the hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and should be construed accordingly. It was passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modern civilization that one of the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel.
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Part 4: How the False Claims Act Works After the 2009-2010 Amendments (with Comparisons to Some State False Claims Acts)

This Part 4 of a six part summary explains how the federal False Claims Act works, after Congress amended it three times in 2009-2010. It also discusses similar provisions of some state False Claims Acts.

This is an update from a previously published article by whistleblower lawyer blog author Michael A. Sullivan.

III. Overview of How the Modern False Claims Act Works (with Comparisons to Some State False Claims Acts)

A. Conduct Prohibited

The federal False Claims Act imposes civil liability under several different theories, only four of which were generally used before FERA. FERA has added an additional theory of liability for retention of overpayments, which now will likely be used quite often in health care cases:

First, the Act makes liable any person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a “false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”

Second, the Act creates liability for using a “false record or statement.” It imposes liability on any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”

“Claim” is broadly defined, and is not limited to submissions made directly to the federal government:
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Part 5: The Trend of Recoveries Under the False Claims Act

This is Part 5 of 6 of a recently updated article about the qui tam whistleblower statutes, the federal False Claims Act and the new state False Claims Acts. This is an updated version of a previously published article by whistleblower lawyer blog author Michael A. Sulliva.

This Part 5 discusses the striking success of the False Claims Act since its 1986 Amendments, as it has recovered more than $27 billion in taxpayers’ money wrongfully obtained by fraud and false claims.

IV. The Trend of Recent Recoveries Under the False Claims Act

Over the past twenty-four years since the modern False Claims Act was established through the 1986 Amendments, the federal government’s recoveries of dollars have grown astronomically, especially in health care cases. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) statistics tell the story:

In 1987, the government’s recoveries in qui tam cases totaled zero, presumably because the 1986 Amendments had just taken effect; and total recoveries under the False Claims Act were just $86 million. The following year, qui tam and other False Claims Act settlements and judgments began a steady climb upward, exceeding $200 million by 1989, and $300 million by 1991. By 1994, the government’s recoveries broke the $1 billion mark for the first time, with $380 million of that amount attributable to qui tam case recoveries alone.

In 2000, the government recovered more than $1.5 billion, of which $1.2 billion was derived from qui tam actions. In 2001, the government recovered more than $1.7 billion, with almost $1.2 billion of that amount from qui tam cases. With the exception of 2004, in each year since 2000 the government has recovered more than a billion dollars per year under the False Claims Act, and qui tam actions were responsible for the lion’s share of those recoveries. For example, in 2003, government recoveries exceeded $2.2 billion, of which $1.4 billion came from qui tam cases. Similarly, in 2005, of the government’s total recovery of $1.4 billion, $1.1 billion of that amount came from qui tam cases.

In 2006, the Justice Department recovered a record of more than $3.1 billion in settlements and judgments for fraud and false claims. Of this record $3.1 billion in recoveries, 72% came from the health care field; 20% from defense; and 8% from other sources. In that record year, health care alone accounted for $2.2 billion in settlements and judgments, which included a $920 million settlement with Tenet Healthcare Corporation, the country’s second-largest hospital chain. Defense procurement fraud amounted to $609 million in recoveries, which included a $565 million settlement with the Boeing Company.

In 2010, DOJ set a record for health care fraud recoveries of $2.5 billion, out of a total of $3 billion recovered from civil fraud claims. $2.3 billion of that $3 billion resulted from qui tam cases. DOJ also set a two-year record for recoveries of $5.4 billion in 2009-2010, most as a result of qui tam cases.
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