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IRS Whistleblower Rewards to Convicted UBS Whistleblower Birkenfeld? The Rule of Law Will Sort It Out.

November 28, 2009
Michael Sullivan

In “Protecting Whistleblowers from Criminal Prosecution,” we expressed our amazement at how UBS “whistleblower” Brad Birkenfeld got himself prosecuted for a federal felony while attempting to set himself up for rewards through the new IRS Whistleblower Program. Birkenfeld’s case is highlighted in recent articles by Lynnley Browning in Friday’s New York Times and by Martha Brannigan in Saturday’s Miami Herald.

To attorneys with prosecution experience who represent whistleblowers, it is shocking that Birkenfeld apparently missed a clear opportunity to avoid prosecution altogether by simply “coming clean” and telling the whole truth about his own actions at the outset.

We have a much different take on Birkenfeld’s case than those who suggest it should scare away potential IRS whistleblowers. Whistleblowers who are willing to tell the truth from the start can easily avoid Birkenfeld’s fate, so long as they follow the law and counsel’s advice to disclose all. At the same time, we take issue with critics who say Birkenfeld should not even be considered for an IRS Whistleblower reward, since the “rule of law” should determine the answer to that question.

First, Birkenfeld’s case should make other potential IRS whistleblowers careful about pursuing IRS whistleblower claims, but not fearful. Most IRS whistleblowers face no realistic chance of prosecution, especially since the government often must depend on whistleblower information to make cases.

Even those relatively few whistleblowers with possible exposure such as Birkenfeld (who admitted to engaging in a tax fraud scheme) can often negotiate protection from prosecution, but only if they tell the whole truth from the start, and follow the rules for obtaining protection. This was a topic in the “IRS Whistleblower Boot Camp” panel discussion that I led this past March, with panelists including IRS Whistleblower Office Director Steve Whitlock–how to protect the whistleblower who has potential exposure.

Why Birkenfeld apparently thought he could get away with withholding information from the government about his own wrongdoing–a foolish move to us–remains a mystery, even after we reviewed his sentencing transcript. That horrendous judgment call distinguishes Birkenfeld’s case from all other whistleblower cases we have seen.

At Birkenfeld’s sentencing, prosecutor Kevin Downing explained that Birkenfeld’s information was extremely valuable to the IRS, and that Birkenfeld probably would not have been prosecuted had he simply been forthcoming by disclosing his own misconduct in assisting tax evasion:

“BUT FOR MR. BIRKENFELD FAILING TO DISCLOSE HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE FRAUD AND THE U.S. CLIENTS THAT HE AIDED AND ASSISTED IN TAX EVASION, I BELIEVE WE WELL WOULD HAVE NONPROSECUTED MR. BIRKENFELD. BUT GIVEN THE FACT THAT HE REFUSED TO PROVIDE THAT INFORMATION AND LED US DOWN A COURSE WHERE WE HAD TO START [TO] INVESTIGATE MR. BIRKENFELD AND HIS ACTIVITIES, THAT IS WHY WE ARE HERE TODAY, THAT IS WHY HE WAS INDICTED, AND THAT’S WHY HE PLED.” (Birkenfeld Sentencing Tr. 12-13)(emphasis supplied).
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IRS “Voluntary Disclosure” Program Inundated by More Than 14,000 Taxpayers

November 17, 2009
Michael Sullivan

We have followed with great interest the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program, especially after the UBS settlement created fear of discovery in many U.S. taxpayers with offshore accounts.

IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman announced that the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program was flooded with submissions by more than 14,000 taxpayers, according to the Wall Street Journal.

IRS Whistleblower cases have been impacted–and in some cases probably pre-empted–by the submissions of recalcitrant taxpayers to the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program. The IRS Criminal Investigative Division in certain areas
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New SEC Whistleblower Rewards and Whistleblower Protections Approved by House Committee–But Improvements Are Needed

November 9, 2009
Michael Sullivan

Since the Madoff and Stanford schemes proved ruinous to so many investors, many have asked why the SEC has no meaningful “whistleblower” program to expose wrongdoing, a topic we have written about previously.

Perhaps Harry Markopolis’ voice is finally being heard, albeit faintly. Last week, the House Financial Services Committee approved legislation that would expand both whistleblower rewards and whistleblower protections, among other things.

Still, past experience with the False Claims Act and the IRS Whistleblower statute shows that the proposed rewards need to be beefed up to be effective.

The “Investor Protection Act of 2009” (excerpted below) also would increase the SEC’s budget and make other changes designed to strengthen enforcement.

The new rewards to whistleblowers would be up to 30% of monetary sanctions of more than $1 million:

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New ‘‘Health Care Fraud Enforcement Act of 2009’’ Includes Health Care Whistleblower Provisions Aimed at Kickbacks

October 30, 2009
Michael Sullivan

The battle against those who steal taxpayer dollars through Medicare fraud and other health care fraud took a step forward this week. The Senate is now considering the “Health Care Fraud Enforcement Act,” which will enhance the government’s tools used to investigate and remedy Medicare and Medicaid fraud.

After a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing Wednesday on “Effective Strategies for Preventing Health Care Fraud,” Senators Leahy, Kaufman, Specter, Kohl, Schumer, and Klobuchar sponsored the new anti-fraud measure.

Excerpts of the Senate announcement follow:

The bill makes straightforward but critical improvements to the federal sentencing guidelines, to health care fraud statutes, and to forfeiture, money laundering, and obstruction statutes, all of which would strengthen prosecutors’ ability to combat this particularly destructive form of fraud. These improvements include:

o Sentencing increases: The bill directs the Sentencing Commission to increase the guidelines range for health care fraud offenses and clarifies that the full potential scope of the fraud should be considered at sentencing.

o Redefining “health care fraud offense”: The bill includes all health care crimes within the definition of “health care fraud offense,” regardless of where they are codified. (ERISA, drug marketing, and kickback crimes are currently not included) This change will make available to law enforcement the full range of antifraud tools, including criminal forfeiture and obstruction penalties, to combat these offenses.

o Improving whistleblower claims: Kickbacks lead to unnecessary and risky medical care and pervert the doctor-patient relationship. This bill clarifies that all payments made pursuant to illegal kickbacks are false for purposes of the False Claims Act.

o Creating a common-sense mental state requirement for health care fraud offenses: Some courts have held that defendants must be aware that their conduct violates a specific provision of criminal law in order to be held accountable. This bill restores the original intent of Congress that a person is guilty of a health care offense if he knowingly does what the law forbids.

o Increasing funding: Money spent on health care fraud prevention and enforcement is returned manifold through costs savings and civil and criminal recoveries. This bill authorizes a modest, yet significant, increase in federal antifraud spending of $20,000,000 per year through 2016.

The new bill would add to legislation earlier this year to strengthen law enforcement statutes aimed at fraud, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act.

Of particular importance to qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act, the nation’s major whistleblower law, the new bill removes any ambiguity that “kickbacks” violate the False Claims Act. The official summary discusses kickbacks in section 2(c):

Section 2(c). Kickbacks
All too often, health care providers secure business by paying illegal kickbacks, which needlessly increase health care risks and costs. When a doctor’s independent judgment is compromised by a kickback, the patient faces the risk that the doctor is making decisions that are not in the patient’s best interest. In addition, excessive payments to doctors increase health care costs, may result in unfair competition, and may compromise medical research independence and the standards of scientific integrity.

The Department of Justice has had success both prosecuting illegal kickbacks and pursuing False Claims Act (FCA) matters predicated on underlying violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). Nevertheless, defendants in such FCA cases continue to mount legal challenges. A court recently held that, even though a device company may have paid a kickback to a doctor to use a particular medical device, the bill for the procedure to implant the device was not false because the claim was submitted by the innocent hospital, and not by the doctor. United States ex rel. Thomas v. Bailey, 2008 WL 4853630 (E.D. Ark.) (Nov. 6, 2008). In other words, a claim that results from a kickback and that is false when submitted by a wrongdoer is laundered into a “clean” claim when an innocent third party finally submits the claim to the government for payment. This has the effect of insulating both the payor and the recipient of the kickback from FCA liability. This obstacle to a successful FCA action particularly limits Department’s ability to recover from pharmaceutical and device manufacturers, because in such instances the claims arising from the illegal kickbacks typically are not submitted by the physicians that received the kickbacks, but by pharmacies and hospitals that had no knowledge of the underlying unlawful conduct.

This section remedies the problem by amending the AKS to ensure that all claims resulting from illegal kickbacks are false, even when the claims are not submitted directly by the wrongdoers themselves. (Notably, in such circumstances, neither AKS nor FCA liability will lie against an innocent third party that submitted the claim but lacked the requisite intent required under those statutes.)

The full text of the bill is below:
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Health Care Fraud Strike Force Targets Medicare and Medicaid Fraud

October 25, 2009
Michael Sullivan

With the nation’s health care costs growing, a DOJ and HHS initiative to combat health care fraud continues to show progress.

Building on past enforcement efforts, in May 2009 the government announced its Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT), as part of what is now a Cabinet-level battle against Medicare fraud. To date in FY 2009, the Department of Justice has recovered close to one billion dollars in health care fraud cases, and has obtained 300 convictions.

Last week, the government announced
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New False Claims Act Amendments Strengthen Enforcement of Health Care Fraud and Procurement Fraud Laws

October 25, 2009
Michael Sullivan

Defrauding the government of taxpayer dollars has gotten tougher over the past five months.

Important changes to the nation’s primary anti-fraud statute, the False Claims Act, took effect on May 20, 2009, when the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 became law.

Among the most significant changes, Congress clarified and corrected the False Claims Act by legislatively overruling certain court decisions that sought to limit the scope of the Act, including Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008); United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1032 (2005); and United States ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 617 (E.D. Va. 2005), rev’d, 562 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2009).

These important 2009 changes to the False Claims Act include the following:

1. The amendments expand the definition of “claim,” and fraud directed against government contractors, grantees and other recipients is now plainly covered by the law.

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Part 2: IRS Whistleblower Program Report by Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA)

October 8, 2009
Michael Sullivan

We wrote yesterday about the just-released report on the new IRS Whistleblower Program by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). The “rest of the story” should be told.

Some history is essential to evaluate how far the handling of whistleblower (or “informant”) claims has progressed since the newly created IRS Whistleblower Office was formed in early 2007, and what is still needed.

Although information provided by whistleblowers is extremely effective in exposing fraud, before 2006 Congress had not authorized an effective IRS whistleblower rewards program–and some in Congress affirmatively opposed one.

Some of this history is described in a 2006 report by TIGTA, which helped prompt Congress to create the new IRS Whistleblower Rewards Program. That 2006 report described the value of informant claims–and also the absence of any centralized process within the IRS for coordinating those claims. It described what the new IRS Whistleblower Office Director and still-to-be-hired staff would inherit in February 2007.

First, the 2006 IG Report leaves no doubt about how valuable “informant” information has been to the IRS–even when there was no coordination of informant claims:

The Informants’ Rewards Program has significantly contributed to the IRS’ efforts to enforce tax laws, but additional management focus could enhance the effectiveness of the Program as an enforcement tool and make the process more accommodating to informants. Our analysis of IRS data indicated that examinations initiated based on informant information were often more effective and efficient than returns initiated using the IRS’ primary method for selecting returns for examination.

Nonetheless, perhaps based in part on the past hostility toward the IRS’s making effective use of whistleblowers before 2006, the old “informant” program was no program at all. This was the “mess” that the new Whistleblower Office Director and tiny staff of four inherited and had to start revamping in 2007, as described by TIGTA’s 2006 report:
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IRS Whistleblower Program: Inspector General Urges Whistleblower Protection from Retaliation and Administrative Changes

October 7, 2009
Michael Sullivan

Today the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) released a Report on the IRS Whistleblower Program that urges Congress to protect IRS whistleblowers from retaliation by employers, and recommends various administrative changes to the Program.

The Report’s title, “Deficiencies Exist in the Control and Timely Resolution of Whistleblower Claims,” is misleading to this writer, who has followed the progress of the new Program since its inception. Before Congress created the new IRS Whistleblower program in December 2006, the Inspector General had observed
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IRS Whistleblower Office Issues Latest Annual Report to Congress

September 28, 2009
Michael Sullivan

The IRS Whistleblower Office has released its Annual Report to Congress, for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2008. Some highlights are below:

First, the IRS Whistleblower Program has experienced explosive growth since Congress authorized these new IRS Whistleblower rewards in December 2006.

According to this Report, “the initial results suggest that whistleblowers with significant knowledge are coming forward as a result of the changes to the award program. We received claims that appear to meet the section 7623(b) criteria on 46
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Health Care Fraud Lawyers to Analyze Recent Amendments to False Claims Act

September 26, 2009
Michael Sullivan

At the “Advanced Health Law” seminar on October 9, attorneys prosecuting and defending cases of alleged health care fraud will discuss the important new amendments to the False Claims Act. I am honored to be the panelist who will discuss these important new provisions from the perspective of representing whistleblowers (known as “relators”) who bring qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act.

These significant changes to the False Claims Act took effect on May 20, 2009, when the Fraud Enforcement and
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Part 6: States’ Experiences With Their Own False Claims Acts

December 7, 2010
Michael Sullivan

This Part 6 is the final installment of an article explaining why the major qui tam whistleblower statute, the federal False Claims Act, has led to a wave of new state False Claims Acts. It is an updated version of part of a previously published article by whistleblower lawyer blog author Michael A. Sullivan.

V. States’ Experiences With Their Own False Claims Acts

As noted, at least twenty-eight states now have a False Claims statute, and many other states are considering similar laws. The financial incentives of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 have not only prompted states that lacked False Claims statutes to enact them, but also have caused many states wishing to qualify for the additional funds to amend their existing False Claims statutes.

In essence, while states may enact “tougher” or more comprehensive laws than the federal False Claims Act, states with “weaker” or less effective laws-as judged by the standards of the Deficit Reduction Act-will not qualify for the additional funds.

Seven of the first ten states whose statutes were scrutinized by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) quickly learned this lesson when OIG disapproved their state statutes. These included California (which lacked a minimum penalty), Florida (which omitted “fraudulent” from its definition of claims), Indiana (which did not make defendants liable for “deliberate ignorance” and “reckless disregard”), Louisiana (which did not permit the state to intervene in cases, set too low a percentage for whistleblowers to recover, and set no minimum penalty), Michigan (which omitted penalties and liability for decreasing or avoiding an obligation to pay the government, i.e., a “reverse false claim”), Nevada (which had a statute of limitations too short and a minimum penalty too low), and Texas (which did not permit the whistleblower to litigate the case if the state did not, and which provided for lower percentage shares to whistleblowers and lower penalties). Most of these states have gone back to the drawing board to correct these deficiencies.

In sum, the Deficit Reduction Act has set minimum standards for state False Claims Acts for states wishing to receive these additional funds. In plain English, the state laws must protect at least Medicaid funds, and they must be at least as effective as the federal False Claims Act, especially in rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for false or fraudulent claims, with damages and penalties no less than those under the federal Act.
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Insider Trading Probe Reinforces Immediate Need for Strongest SEC Whistleblower Program

November 21, 2010
Michael Sullivan

Yesterday’s Wall Street Journal reports a “sweeping” insider trading investigation, with civil and criminal charges soon to follow, involving “consultants, investment bankers, hedge-fund and mutual-fund traders, and analysts across the nation.”

While the details remain to be seen, the unending series of fraud cases that continue–despite Sarbanes-Oxley–proves why Wall Street must not be allowed to neuter the first potentially meaningful SEC whistleblower program, mandated by the Dodd-Frank financial reform law.

How is it that the hallowed “compliance programs” born from Sarbanes-Oxley have utterly failed to stop the breathtaking frauds of Madoff, Stanford, and other recent post-SOX scandals?

As many honest employees encountering fraud discover, too often “compliance programs” mask efforts to identify employees who object to wrongdoing, so the wrongdoers can then gut their careers.

How well did compliance programs work at the many Madoff-abetting feeder funds that made scores of millions, as Madoff’s scheme spread to snare more victims? Read Harry Markopolis’ book to see how many of those firms’ “compliance” efforts worked, as Madoff’s enablers ignored glaring warning signs that multiplied over the life of the scheme.

SEC Chair Mary Schapiro and Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami seem dedicated to invigorating the SEC’s enforcement efforts. While the new proposed SEC whistleblower rules show considerable thought, they threaten the program’s effectiveness by bowing too far to industry concerns, and excluding many potential whistleblowers such as accountants, who may be the best position to stop the next Madoff.

Wall Street would have the SEC create a labyrinth of further exceptions to who can participate in the new SEC Whistleblower program. One lethal industry proposal is to require potential whistleblowers first to run the gauntlet of firms’ “compliance” programs–a concept wholly inconsistent with Congress’ intent that whistleblowers must be allowed to report violations anonymously.

The initial screening of SEC whistleblower claims should not be outsourced to the very firms alleged to have violated the law, which is what mandatory internal reporting effectively would do. The SEC–like the Department of Justice and IRS–should be the first to screen SEC whistleblower claims. With any SEC whistleblower claim large enough to pursue, by definition the culpable firm has typically approved the violation, or at least looked the other way.

Otherwise, who in a position to expose significant fraud would come forward, if required first to reveal their objections to the fraud to those who may have approved it? And if the fraud stays concealed–as it too often has despite “compliance” programs–the public loses.

Excerpts from the WSJ article by SUSAN PULLIAM, MICHAEL ROTHFELD,JENNY STRASBURG and GREGORY ZUCKERMAN are below:
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With New SEC Whistleblower Program Proposed Rules Announced, Will the SEC Allow Potential Defendants to Gut Them?

November 4, 2010
Michael Sullivan

We have been awaiting the SEC’s proposed rules for its new SEC Whistleblower Program, released yesterday. Even before the announcement, however, those who oppose this first potentially meaningful SEC Whistleblower Program have begun efforts to undermine it.

The SEC’s website already includes some firms’ suggestions to impose extreme restrictions on SEC whistleblowers–contrary to how other successful whistleblower programs operate.

Designing any new whistleblower program should begin with studying more than two decades of successes of the nation’s major whistleblower law, the False Claims Act. The False Claims Act has been so effective in uncovering and penalizing fraud against the government since 1986 that it has inspired Congress and the states to enact a wave of new whistleblower statutes–including the Dodd-Frank whistleblower mandate in section 922.

Unless the SEC seeks to create an ineffective program, it makes no sense to impose restrictions on whistleblowers that do not exist in False Claims Act cases.

One such damaging restriction would be requiring whistleblowers first to report within the company violations of the law, before going to the SEC. Past experience with the False Claims Act shows that warning violators of the law (who know their own violations) invites destruction of evidence by those who engineered the lawbreaking, and destroys the whistleblower’s career.

Other deceptive suggestions are that the SEC follow the “approach” of the promising new IRS Whistleblower Program–but with far greater restrictions on whistleblowing.

For example, one representative of future defendants urges what are actually variations on the “one-bite” and “no-bite” rules of the IRS, which historically have restricted the IRS’s receipt of certain information, or information from certain whistleblowers.

In fact, the IRS trend appears to be the opposite. In a March 2010 IRS Notice and in June 2010 changes to the Internal Revenue Manual, the “one-bite” rule appears to be giving way to the more sensible approach of allowing whistleblowers more than “one bite” at submitting information that may be useful to the IRS.

Likewise, a suggestion that the SEC adopt a variation the “no-bite” rule would expand it far beyond the IRS concept of not accepting information from the “taxpayer’s representative” before the IRS. This suggestion would go much further and prohibit submissions to the SEC by anyone who has a “fiduciary” duty to a public company–which arguably could be most or all employees.

We will comment further on the specifics of yesterday’s proposed rules, but the basic principles above should guide the SEC in what it finally decides.

The SEC’s announcement yesterday is reprinted below:
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Links to SEC Whistleblower and CFTC Whistleblower Lawyer Information

October 18, 2010
Michael Sullivan

Our whistleblower lawyer blog has followed closely the development of the first potentially meaningful SEC Whistleblower and Commodities Whistleblower Programs. That link provides regular updates.

Based on our firm’s long experience in representing whistleblowers, we were asked by the Senate Banking Committee staff for input in how the new SEC and CFTC whistleblower provisions of the July 2010 Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act should work. We urged that the Senate change the tepid House version, which provided no meaningful rewards to whistleblowers,
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SEC Recovers $39 Million under Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for Bribery and Kickbacks in Mexico and Iraq

September 29, 2010
Michael Sullivan

One of the most interesting twists to the new SEC Whistleblower Program will be how many commercial bribes and kickbacks paid to foreign government officials will now come to light. As we have written about previously, the SEC shares jurisdiction with the Justice Department over such cases that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

An example of why whistleblowers will come forward is this afternoon’s announcement of the SEC’s $39 million settlement with ABB Ltd (“ABB”), a Swiss company that provides power and automation products and services.

The SEC alleged that ABB made more than $2.7 million in bribes and kickbacks to obtain more than $100 million in contracts. The payments allegedly were made to “government officials in Mexico to obtain business with government owned power companies,” and to the “former regime in Iraq to obtain contracts under the United Nations Oil for Food Program.”

According to the SEC, some of the kickbacks were made through bank guarantees and cash payments. As is common in disguising unlawful payments, the kickbacks were recorded on the company’s books as legitimate payments–here, for “after sales services,” “consultation costs,” and “commissions.”

ABB, without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, agreed not only to pay disgorgement and penalties totalling more than $39 million, but also agreed to pay a criminal fine of $30,420,000, according to the SEC. The company also agreed to be bound by certain “undertakings” concerning its FCPA compliance program.

As to how an FCPA whistleblower might fare who reports similar FCPA violations of bribery of foreign government officials, the new SEC Whistleblower Program pays 10% to 30% of monetary sanctions collected–approximately $4 million to $12 million under similar facts.

The SEC’s announcement is reprinted in full below, and the SEC’s Complaint is linked here:
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Health Care Fraud Cases and 2009-2010 Amendments to False Claims Act Discussed at National Fraud and Compliance Forum

September 26, 2010
Michael Sullivan

At the annual Fraud and Compliance Forum in Baltimore that runs through Tuesday, the nation’s top health care lawyers will be paying close attention to recent changes to the nation’s primary whistleblower law, the False Claims Act. The “qui tam” provisions of the False Claims Act allow private citizen whistleblowers (“relators”) to share in the government’s recovery of damages.

As a former defense attorney who now represents whistleblowers, I have been asked to present a program at this conference with Rick Shackelford of King & Spalding, to discuss these major amendments to the False Claims Act–the first since 1986. Congress acted decisively in three recent major bills to restore the False Claims Act to its intended strength, in the face of court decisions that created obstacles to its use.

The recent amendments were part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (“FERA”); the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (“PPACA”); and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (the “Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act”).

This week’s forum is sponsored by the American Health Lawyers Association and Health Care Compliance Association.

An updated discussion of the False Claims Act after these 2009 and 2010 changes will appear soon on this Whistleblower Lawyer Blog. A brief summary of those important changes to the Act is below:
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Indiana Attorney General Invites Qui Tam Whistleblower Cases by Health Care & Pharmaceutical Employees To Stop Health Care Fraud

August 20, 2010
Michael Sullivan

Smart and effective state Attorneys General have fought fraud against their citizens through encouraging greater use of the country’s major whistleblower law, the False Claims Act, and state versions of that law.

Texas AG Greg Abbott, for example, has a staff that has long distinguished itself for recovering millions of stolen taxpayer funds in health care fraud cases, under the leadership of Pat O’Connell and, more recently, Ray Winter.

Following this tradition, Indiana AG Greg Zoeller is urging employees of pharmaceutical companies and heath care entities to help stop health care fraud, and possibly share in the recovery as qui tam whistleblowers under the state and federal False Claims Acts.

While we have discussed in detail how the False Claims Act operates, AG Zoeller’s announcement gives a succinct summary. We have reprinted it below, and applaud his efforts.
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Shouldn’t the IRS Pay Tax Whistleblowers Who Help Prevent Fraudulent Refunds?

August 18, 2010
Michael Sullivan

When IRS whistleblowers save U.S taxpayers money, they deserve the rewards that lawmakers such as Sen. Chuck Grassley fought to establish. In 2006 his efforts resulted in the first meaningful IRS Whistleblower program ever, which is attracting many tax whistleblowers with significant evidence.

We have discussed previously the many positive aspects of the long-awaited IRS Whistleblower procedures published in June–and one illogical, self-defeating feature. Some in the IRS–and apparently not the IRS Whistleblower Office–thought whistleblowers should not be rewarded when they report tax
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Merck and Other Pharma Companies Probed by DOJ and SEC in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Investigation

August 9, 2010
Michael Sullivan

When Pharma manufacturers are targeted by the Department of Justice, qui tam whistleblower cases under the False Claims Act are often the reason.

Now, whistleblowers may also receive rewards for reporting violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), thanks to the new whistleblower provisions of the Wall Street financial reform law. Announcements like Merck’s recent SEC filing that it is now the subject an FCPA investigation involving other Pharma companies should become common, as corruption will now be increasingly exposed in a new wave of SEC Whistleblower cases.

The recent 10-Q filing of Merck & Co., Inc. stated in part:

The Company has received letters from the DOJ and the SEC that seek information about activities in a number of countries and reference the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Company is cooperating with the agencies in their requests and believes that this inquiry is part of a broader review of pharmaceutical industry practices in foreign countries.

As we have followed through its development, the Dodd-Frank financial reform law created the new SEC Whistleblower and CFTC Whistleblower programs, which will include FCPA cases.

The FCPA, as we have discussed previously, prohibits bribery of foreign government officials in international business transactions, and false entries in books and records of those companies within the statute. Whistleblowers who assist the SEC recover monetary sanctions in FCPA cases now have an enforceable right to a monetary award of 10-30%.

Pharma’s exposure for any bribes and kickbacks abroad are a ripe subject for FCPA enforcement.
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Does SEC Whistleblower Reward of $1 Million Signal A New Attitude Toward Wall Street Whistleblowing?

August 8, 2010
Michael Sullivan

Only days after the new financial reform law created the first potentially meaningful awards for whistleblowers reporting securities and commodities violations and abuses, the SEC may have signaled a new attitude toward encouraging whistleblowers.

The SEC recently announced its first million dollar award for a whistleblower’s report of information about insider trading involving hedge fund adviser Pequot Capital Management, Inc., its chief executive, Arthur J. Samberg, and David E. Zilkha, a Microsoft employee.

Although $1 million may not sound like much when compared to the losses caused by the Madoffs of the world, it is a dramatic improvement over what the SEC had done before.

In following the development of the new SEC Whistleblower Program, we previously discussed the Inspector General’s summary of how, over the past eleven years, the SEC had paid a total of less than $160,000 to reward whistleblowers under the “old” SEC bounty program for whistleblowers. The IG reported:

The SEC bounty program has made very few payments to whistleblowers since its inception and received a relatively small number of bounty applications. As a result, the program’s success has been minimal and its existence is practically unknown.
Since the inception of the SEC bounty program in 1989, the SEC has paid a total of $159,537 to five claimants as detailed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Bounty Payments to Whistleblowers Bounty Claimant Year Bounty Amount 1) Claimant 1 1989 $3,500 2) Claimant 2 2001 $18,152 3) Claimant 3 2002 $29,079 4) Claimant 4 2005 $17,500 4) Claimant 4 2006 $29,920 4) Claimant 4 2009 $55,220 5) Claimant 5 2007 $6,166
Total $159,537
Source: OIG Generated

Just as another Inspector General’s report in 2006 set the stage for the successful new IRS Whistleblower Program that is attracting many reports of even billions in tax liability, let’s hope this Inspector General’s report has motivated the SEC to make full use of the opportunity to build a meaningful whistleblower program. We are already getting calls from potential Wall Street whistleblowers wishing to take advantage of it, and it could be a rewarding process–depending on how well the SEC seizes the opportunity.

The SEC’s recent announcement of the $1 million reward is reprinted below:
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